Notes
Slide Show
Outline
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The U.S. Midstream Sector:
“Meeting the Challenges in Turbulent Times”
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The Midstream Sector is no stranger to challenges as demonstrated by past themes of Annual GPA Conferences
  • 1983 - “Challenging New Horizons”
  • 1993 - “Succeeding in a “World of Challenges”
  • 1998 - “Creating Value in a Challenging World”
  • 2003 - “Extracting Opportunities in Turbulent Times”
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Topics to be Covered
  • Define the Midstream Sector
  • Look at its History & Past Challenges
  • Examine its Current Make-up
  • Identify the Major Issues & Challenges
  • Discuss the Ability of Midstream Players to deal with these Issues & Challenges
  • Ponder the Sector’s Future & Its Leadership
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Typically Midstream Assets are considered deregulated assets, such as:
  • Gas Gathering & Processing
  • Gas Pipelines (Primarily Intrastate)
  • Product Pipelines
  • Fractionation
  • Gas & Product Storage
  • Inland Product Terminals
  • Import/Export Facilities
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The NGL Midstream Sector is where the E&P, Gas, Petrochemical and Refining Industries Meet
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History and Past Challenges
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Early history of the Midstream Sector
  • Majors built midstream assets to bring equity production to market and to supply their refineries & petrochemical operations.


  • Interstate Pipelines expanded into gathering & processing to grow their rate base and secure supplies
  • “Old Line” Chemical Companies built NGL gathering lines, gas pipelines, fractionators and storage facilities to secure their fuel and feedstock supplies.
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Early Participants had Strong Upstream Drivers, Downstream Drivers or both
  • Midstream assets had an utility function and did not necessarily operate as a profit center.
  • Seldom were these midstream assets set up to serve third parties.
  • Unwillingness to rationalize capacity or sell marginal assets




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Independent Midstream Players became prominent in the ’80’s.
  • Such players were: Delhi, Enterprise, HPL, MAPCO, Mitchell, Tejas, and Valero.
  • Oriented in major producing basins and/or in major market centers.
  • Operated in a fairly deregulated environment.
  • Mostly dependent on the wholesale markets.
  • Operated for profit, serving third parties.


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The excesses of the 80’s led to rationalization & consolidation in the early 90’s
  • Some E&P companies sold their midstream assets as their equity production declined and/or their focus was redirected internationally
  • M&A activity among independent midstream players began to occur.
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In the mid to late 1990’s, a 2nd flurry of
M&A activities engulfed the Midstream Sector
  • Independents buying the midstream assets of the Majors.
    • Tejas buying Exxon’s intrastate gas pipelines, Transok and Amoco Gas
    • NGC buying Warren and Trident
    • One exception: Shell buying Tejas
  • Diversified Energy Companies adding to their      midstream positions.
    • Williams buying MAPCO
    • El Paso buying Tenneco (Oasis, Channel), Cornerstone, Tejas Power
    • PanEnergy buying Mobil midstream and Associated Natural Gas
  • Regulated Utilities acquiring midstream
    • PG&E buying Valero Natural Gas
    • Duke Power buying PanEnergy and UPR midstream
    • Pacificorp buying Tejas Power (storage)
    • Utilicorp buying Aquila Gas/Oasis






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Back then, the common motivators for Midstream transactions were to:
  • Acquire non-regulated assets to achieve greater rates of returns and margins
  • Enhance or provide scope & scale in a supply and/or market regions
  • Create synergies through integration with upstream or downstream operations
  • Broaden customer diversity
  • Secure more products and services
  • Create a “platform” for marketing and trading


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However, many acquirers failed to recognize the risks......
  • Being non-regulated, midstream entities can be susceptible to host of business risks:




  • Many midstream assets were bought at EBITDA multiples of 10 x or more.
    • Implied a ROI in the single digits
    • Particularly sensitive to profit downturns.




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.....or knew how to succeed
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By 2000, some Acquirers had
had enough with Midstream
  • PG&E dumps Valero Natural Gas
  • TransCanada jettisons their Louisiana assets
  • Shell sells Tejas Gas Pipeline
  • LG&E dumps Hadson
  • Pacificorp sells Tejas Power
  • Koch sells Delhi




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Recently, a new wave of Midstream transactions and turnovers is being driven by:
  • The implosion of the Energy Merchants and Utilities


          • -And-


  • Master Limited Partnerships
    • Acquiring midstream assets from their corporate parents, if they have one; or,
    • Acquiring from Energy Merchants seeking to strengthen their balance sheets





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Current Top Players Along the NGL Value Chain
(ranked according to operating position)
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Current Realities, Issues & Challenges
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Current Realities & Issues
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“Frac Spread” is highly volatile due to the fluctuations in crude & natural gas prices
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Fundamental Shift is occurring in North American Gas Markets
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On the Supply Side...A structural change could be underway:
  • Lower 48 basins are maturing with the exception of  deep water GOM and the Rockies.
  • Drilling needs to accelerate to offset natural declines from conventional sources.
  • Majors focusing on international prospects, unconventional plays & deep water GOM.
  • Many producers less optimistic about accessing new & additional U.S. sources.
  • Many producers limited by leveraged balance sheets.


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The Midstream Sector is growing increasingly dependent on the U.S. Petrochemical Industry
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A high priced gas environment could force the Ethylene Industry to minimize ethane cracking.
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Petrochemical Consolidation
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"1."
  • 1.    DEFS* ----------------
  • 2.    BP  ---------------------
  • 3.    El Paso ---------------
  • 4.    Williams --------------
  • 5.    ExxonMobil ----------
  • 6.    Enterprise ------------
  • 7.    ONEOK ---------------
  • 8.    ConocoPhillips** ----
  • 9.    Devon -----------------
  • 10.  Dynegy ---------------
  • Total Prod. -----------
  • % of US NGLs - Top 5
  • % of US NGLs - Top 10


  • 1.    GPM (Phillips) -------
  • 2.    Exxon ------------------
  • 3.    Amoco -----------------
  • 4.    Texaco ----------------
  • 5.    Dynegy ----------------
  • 6.    UPR --------------------
  • 7.    Valero ------------------
  • 8.    Conoco ----------------
  • 9.    Arco --------------------
  • 10.  Shell --------------------
  • Total Prod. - - - - - - -
  • % of US NGLs - Top 5
  • % of US NGLs - Top 10
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Despite past consolidations and plant closures the avg. utilization rate of U.S. gas processors remains at around 70%.
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The convergence of a number of issues is challenging the Midstream Sector to:
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For Gas Processors, managing price & margin volatility is a major challenge:
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The Direction of the Midstream Sector
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Although there are challenges, opportunities will continue to exist:
  • Gas will continue to be the clean fuel of choice
  • N. American gas reserves can support demand growth with LNG bridging supply/demand gaps
  • 80% of gas produced will need processing or conditioning
  • The U.S. Petrochemical and Refining Industries will remain the largest in the world
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But, the Midstream Sector needs to continue to evolve to become:
….. more efficient,
………...more focused, and
…………………….. more nimble
to tackle the challenges and extract the opportunities.
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How will the Midstream Sector accomplish this task ?
  • Are the risks so great that Midstream assets revert back to being functions controlled by the integrated Majors or large E&P companies?
  • - or -
  • Can there be profitable independent midstream players providing value added services to upstream & downstream customers?





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It all depends on the actions & abilities of the current players:
  • Smaller, niche players
    • Filling regional gaps created by the exit of larger players
  • Energy Merchants
    • Repairing balance sheets in many cases
    • In some cases, selling midstream assets; or,
    • Completing transfer of assets to their MLP
  • Majors
    • Focusing on E&P: offshore and international
    • Holding pattern with regards to their midstream assets
  • Large Independents (MLPs, JVs)
    • A few are actively growing their midstream business
    • Enterprise, TEPPCO, DEFS (Have alliances with “Customers”)
    • However, most MLPs are risk adverse & avoiding processing


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The Midstream Sector needs and can support a small number of integrated players across the NGL value chain
  • Presently there are opportunities to link together complementary midstream assets that are in a “holding pattern”
  • But it takes vision, desire, capital, and the right approach to profitably grow a midstream business
  • In time, solutions will be found to deal with the major issues
    • ....... Alliances or Ventures with “customers” may
    •         play a key role
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The key is linking & leveraging the right assets to manage risks and maximize value...You can’t have a collection of individual assets
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....with factors for success still depending on having:
  • The Vision & Desire to grow the business
  • Strong linkages to one or more major producing region
  • Access to efficient logistic systems to major market centers and customers
  • Low cost operations
  • Selective acquisitions that are synergistic
  • Customer orientation with alliances or JVs
  • Integration to minimize business risks
  • Ability to leverage through incrementality






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In Conclusion
  • Midstream Sector at another inflection point in its history
  • Another round of rationalization & consolidation is needed
  • Companies with Midstream assets will be challenged to decide whether they have the vision & desire to capture the opportunities
  • Companies that can effectively network the right assets together will be successful