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- 1983 - “Challenging New Horizons”
- 1993 - “Succeeding in a “World of Challenges”
- 1998 - “Creating Value in a Challenging World”
- 2003 - “Extracting Opportunities in Turbulent Times”
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- Define the Midstream Sector
- Look at its History & Past Challenges
- Examine its Current Make-up
- Identify the Major Issues & Challenges
- Discuss the Ability of Midstream Players to deal with these Issues &
Challenges
- Ponder the Sector’s Future & Its Leadership
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- Gas Gathering & Processing
- Gas Pipelines (Primarily Intrastate)
- Product Pipelines
- Fractionation
- Gas & Product Storage
- Inland Product Terminals
- Import/Export Facilities
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- Majors built midstream assets to bring equity production to market and
to supply their refineries & petrochemical operations.
- Interstate Pipelines expanded into gathering & processing to grow
their rate base and secure supplies
- “Old Line” Chemical Companies built NGL gathering lines, gas pipelines,
fractionators and storage facilities to secure their fuel and feedstock
supplies.
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- Midstream assets had an utility function and did not necessarily operate
as a profit center.
- Seldom were these midstream assets set up to serve third parties.
- Unwillingness to rationalize capacity or sell marginal assets
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- Such players were: Delhi, Enterprise, HPL, MAPCO, Mitchell, Tejas, and
Valero.
- Oriented in major producing basins and/or in major market centers.
- Operated in a fairly deregulated environment.
- Mostly dependent on the wholesale markets.
- Operated for profit, serving third parties.
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- Some E&P companies sold their midstream assets as their equity
production declined and/or their focus was redirected internationally
- M&A activity among independent midstream players began to occur.
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- Independents buying the midstream assets of the Majors.
- Tejas buying Exxon’s intrastate gas pipelines, Transok and Amoco Gas
- NGC buying Warren and Trident
- One exception: Shell buying Tejas
- Diversified Energy Companies adding to their midstream positions.
- Williams buying MAPCO
- El Paso buying Tenneco (Oasis, Channel), Cornerstone, Tejas Power
- PanEnergy buying Mobil midstream and Associated Natural Gas
- Regulated Utilities acquiring midstream
- PG&E buying Valero Natural Gas
- Duke Power buying PanEnergy and UPR midstream
- Pacificorp buying Tejas Power (storage)
- Utilicorp buying Aquila Gas/Oasis
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- Acquire non-regulated assets to achieve greater rates of returns and
margins
- Enhance or provide scope & scale in a supply and/or market regions
- Create synergies through integration with upstream or downstream
operations
- Broaden customer diversity
- Secure more products and services
- Create a “platform” for marketing and trading
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- Being non-regulated, midstream entities can be susceptible to host of
business risks:
- Many midstream assets were bought at EBITDA multiples of 10 x or more.
- Implied a ROI in the single digits
- Particularly sensitive to profit downturns.
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- PG&E dumps Valero Natural Gas
- TransCanada jettisons their Louisiana assets
- Shell sells Tejas Gas Pipeline
- LG&E dumps Hadson
- Pacificorp sells Tejas Power
- Koch sells Delhi
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- The implosion of the Energy Merchants and Utilities
- Master Limited Partnerships
- Acquiring midstream assets from their corporate parents, if they have
one; or,
- Acquiring from Energy Merchants seeking to strengthen their balance
sheets
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- Lower 48 basins are maturing with the exception of deep water GOM and the Rockies.
- Drilling needs to accelerate to offset natural declines from
conventional sources.
- Majors focusing on international prospects, unconventional plays &
deep water GOM.
- Many producers less optimistic about accessing new & additional U.S.
sources.
- Many producers limited by leveraged balance sheets.
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- 1. DEFS* ----------------
- 2. BP ---------------------
- 3. El Paso ---------------
- 4. Williams --------------
- 5. ExxonMobil ----------
- 6. Enterprise ------------
- 7. ONEOK ---------------
- 8. ConocoPhillips** ----
- 9. Devon -----------------
- 10. Dynegy ---------------
- Total Prod. -----------
- % of US NGLs - Top 5
- % of US NGLs - Top 10
- 1. GPM (Phillips) -------
- 2. Exxon ------------------
- 3. Amoco -----------------
- 4. Texaco ----------------
- 5. Dynegy ----------------
- 6. UPR --------------------
- 7. Valero ------------------
- 8. Conoco ----------------
- 9. Arco --------------------
- 10. Shell --------------------
- Total Prod. - - - - - - -
- % of US NGLs - Top 5
- % of US NGLs - Top 10
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- Gas will continue to be the clean fuel of choice
- N. American gas reserves can support demand growth with LNG bridging
supply/demand gaps
- 80% of gas produced will need processing or conditioning
- The U.S. Petrochemical and Refining Industries will remain the largest
in the world
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- Are the risks so great that Midstream assets revert back to being
functions controlled by the integrated Majors or large E&P
companies?
- - or -
- Can there be profitable independent midstream players providing value
added services to upstream & downstream customers?
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- Smaller, niche players
- Filling regional gaps created by the exit of larger players
- Energy Merchants
- Repairing balance sheets in many cases
- In some cases, selling midstream assets; or,
- Completing transfer of assets to their MLP
- Majors
- Focusing on E&P: offshore and international
- Holding pattern with regards to their midstream assets
- Large Independents (MLPs, JVs)
- A few are actively growing their midstream business
- Enterprise, TEPPCO, DEFS (Have alliances with “Customers”)
- However, most MLPs are risk adverse & avoiding processing
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- Presently there are opportunities to link together complementary
midstream assets that are in a “holding pattern”
- But it takes vision, desire, capital, and the right approach to
profitably grow a midstream business
- In time, solutions will be found to deal with the major issues
- ....... Alliances or Ventures with “customers” may
- play a key role
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- The Vision & Desire to grow the business
- Strong linkages to one or more major producing region
- Access to efficient logistic systems to major market centers and
customers
- Low cost operations
- Selective acquisitions that are synergistic
- Customer orientation with alliances or JVs
- Integration to minimize business risks
- Ability to leverage through incrementality
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- Midstream Sector at another inflection point in its history
- Another round of rationalization & consolidation is needed
- Companies with Midstream assets will be challenged to decide whether
they have the vision & desire to capture the opportunities
- Companies that can effectively network the right assets together will be
successful
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